Category
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Date of Disposal
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The Messy Details
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Triabologna
Not getting the picture.
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March 30, 2008
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Still no straight answer from Triablogue yet as to whether they've been using sockpuppets. In the meantime, we'll amuse ourselves a bit more with some tail-chasing from Hays about how if someone ignores a clear warning intended to deter him, it's because the warning isn't effective enough.
This interpretation poses quite a problem for Arminian theology. If God knows the future, then God knows who will be deterred by his warnings, and who will not be deterred by his warnings. In that event, he never intended to deter those who would disregard his warnings.
A rather glaring error in Hays' logic, God can give a warning that is able to deter people even if He knows they will not heed it. Just because some don't obey Him doesn't mean that God never intended that it deter them from doing evil, it simply means that they displease God (Genesis 38:10, Numbers 11:1, 2 Samuel 11:27). God can offer a thing with the intent of providing a genuine possibility for our good, regardless of whether it will be heeded or not. So His warnings can contingently serve as either a means to stop someone from doing a thing, or as condemnation if they do it, depending on whether it is obeyed or not.
When I wrote,
"If a fully capable driver ignores it and speeds on ahead to his death anyway, would we conclude that it was the sign's fault for not being an effective enough deterrent because it didn't end up saving the driver's life? Of course not."
Hays responded,
If the "task" of the sign is to "be a very effective deterent [sic]," and the driver ignores it, then, by J.C's own definition, it didn’t "perform its task" - in which case it failed. If its task is to deter the driver, and it doesn't deter the driver, then it didn't effect the outcome which it was tasked to perform. How can a warning be a very effective deterrent if the driver is undeterred by the warning?
Herein lies the crux of Hays' faulty reasoning, as was pointed out last time: he equates 'effectiveness' with 'irresistibility.' To demonstrate the difference, scripture tells us,
No temptation has overtaken you except such as is common to man; but God is faithful, who will not allow you to be tempted beyond what you are able, but with the temptation will also make the way of escape, that you may be able to bear it. (1 Corinthians 10:13)
So we as Christians are given by God a way to escape every temptation and not fall into sin, yet many times saints succumb to temptation nonetheless. Does this render God's provision 'ineffective,' since we don't always resist? Not at all. God's provision is *able* to help us escape any temptation; any failure is not with God's provision, but with us. God's provision is effective in that it gives us a way to escape sin, not by forcing us to do so. The intent of His provision is also clear: that we may be able to endure temptation; said intent is not negated by the fact that Christians sometimes fall into sin.
So God's provision by virtue of being able to deliver us from temptation is effective as a means of escape, even if not every Christian utilizes it.
Likewise, God's warnings by virtue of being able to turn us from evil are effective as preventatives, even if not everyone obeys them.
God's foreknowledge of disobedience by His children does not imply that His 'way of escape' is not intended to help us escape temptation.
And so, God's foreknowledge of disobedience to His warnings does not mean that He never intended them as restraint to those who disobey.
By Hays' rather peculiar logic, something that is resistible is automatically 'ineffective,' which ends up rather laughably making infractions not contingent upon the decision of the willful violator, but because the deterrent itself didn't irresistibly cause him to take heed and obey. Go ahead and try that sometime, "But officer, it's not my fault -- the speed limit sign in that school zone wasn't an effective means of making me travel the speed limit."
We get back to Revelation 22:19 again,
To the contrary, it doesn’t say that anyone is in danger of losing his salvation. Rather, it threatens damnation for anyone who tampers with the prophecy.
That would include nominal believers. Indeed, the letters to the seven churches are concerned with nominal believers.
The damnation in this context being worded in terms of losing one's part in the holy city and the tree of life, things only possessed by the redeemed (Revelation 22:14). And once again, Hays can tender no actual reasons as to why the infinitely omniscient God cannot foreknow future libertarian choices. With that, we toss another piece of trash by Hays onto the pile.
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Triabologna
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March 25, 2008
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We got a cute series of responses by the TBloggers concerning our question about sockpuppets, including one by Paul Manata. Among other things, some funny stuff they put out included,
* Citing numerous examples of other people with writing styles similar to his (which Kangaroodort actually anticipated that Manata would do)
* Attempts to discredit our evidence that Paul may have used sockpuppets
* Suggestion that Ben and I use sockpuppets
* The statement "So, perhaps they framed me."
* Citing that Ben was not a sockpuppet
* Accusations of us siding with Atheists -- apparently because they pegged Paul for using sockpuppets
* Admission that he'd used sockpuppets in the past
* A conclusion that this whole affair is a "waste of time"
* Some girly talk
* And last but not least, some rather humorous satire by Gene Bridges
Noticably absent from this top 10 list was one critical item:
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A straight answer.
We haven't accused Paul of posing as anyone else in particular. We did suggest a few possibilities based upon a string of coincidences in wording, spelling, and writing style great enough to raise our suspicions, and have simply asked for a straight and honest answer to confirm or deny them.
We didn't ask if other people write in the same style as Paul does, or if they'd used sockpuppets before talking to us, or if every possibility that we suggested was correct. So for anyone who's been enjoying the circus and forgotten the question altogether, this was what I asked the members of Triablogue:
"Have you posted under different names when making comments pertaining to the exchanges with Kangaroodort and/or myself?"
If they have, it would be nice to know who is who. If they wish the same information from us, our answer as to whether we've done so is a resounding 'no.' Neither of us who write for AP have ever used sockpuppets.
But, until we get an answer, if Manata wants to complain that no one is answering his arguments, Arminian drops a few posts that flatten Manata's 'prayer as a means' argument (capitalized names mine),
*** BEGINNING OF POST ***
MANATA: "Josh, Ben, or whoever,"
ARMINIAN: Are you back to accusing me of lying? I already told you that I am not Josh or Ben. But that does raise the question again you never answered: if you didn't think I am lying, why did you accuse me of lying?
It was strange that you shut down comments in the post in which you seemed to be claiming victory (I say "seems" because I think you said you were not claiming victory) and I challenged you on this, that you never responded to my comments (which you implicitly invited when you said, "No one skewered anything. I showed exactly how it was a means. So, I'll awaie future rebutal.")
MANATA: "I did address your chomment. I pointed out you made classic straw men blunders regarding determinism."
ARMINIAN: You didn't address my comments specifically, and as we shall see, do not even seem to understand them.
MANATA: "You don't think it is a means because God ordained it."
ARMINIAN: This is not true, and suggests you do not understand my comments. God's ordination of it is not what makes it not a means. I acknowledged that various things that are ordained (in the sense you are apparently using the term, i.e., predetermiend and irresistibly caused) can be a means. The point I made is that intercessory prayer is a different sort of thing because of the nature of it. Intercessory prayer is asking God to do something. If God decides to irresistibly cause something to happen (such as cause someone to get saved), and therefore irresisibly causes someone to pray for that thing to happen (such as to pray for the person to get saved), that request God irresistibly caused to be asked to himself cannot reasonably be called a means to the thing happening. I gave some illustrations of this point. I won't repeat them all, but would encourage you to go back and look at them, since you seem to not have understood the point. But I will repeat one of them here:
if someone decides that he will irresitibly cause someone to accept his offer to accept a free check from him (suppose he administers a drug that makes him willing to do whatever he is told), but that he will only do this upon irresitibly causing someone else to ask him to irresistibly cause the other person to accept his offer, that person asking him cannot properly be called a means used to bring that person to accept the check. It does not genuinely influence the check giver except that he wants to cause the intercessor to ask him to do something he was already set on doing. It does not actually affect the check giver who is determining everything everyone is doing in the situation. And it does not affect the check receiver. It would be different if the check giver irresitibly caused another to go and ask the person to receive the check and then irresistibly caused the person to receive the check. In that case, the check offerer would really be a means used to give the person the check. But the situation that relates to intercessory prayer is more like someone who decides he is going to brush his teeth, but he will only brush his teeth after he first says "bonzo". Saying "bonzo" is not a means to brushing his teeth. It is simply something he has determined he wants to be a prerequisite, though it is arbitrarily chosen as a prerequisite. It is not necessary for it to be so.
So what you miss is that intercessory prayer is asking God to do something. So the whole means to an end argument falls apart when all is irresistibly predetermined by God. It is not simply that it is irresistibly predetermined that makes prayer not a means, but the nature of intercessory prayer itself when it is irresistibly caused combined with an irresitibly predetermined/caused end which supposedly dictates the request as a means.
MANATA: "All you were doing is *repeating* libertarian assumptions."
ARMINIAN: Hopefully you see now that this is not the case.
MANATA: "You can't "defeat" my argument by saying, "First, you are begging the question by trying to define intercessory prayer as a means in your argument." If you don't know why, let me explain.
I am not begging the question, as you said, since they were offering an INTERNAL critique. You you guys keep missing is that I answered Ben on his own terms. if you want to move the goal posts and make your argument this:
"Arminian is inconsistent with Calvinism."
Then I gladly conceed. You have beat me straight up.
But since that *wasn't* the initial critique, I am allows to use MY SYSTEM to answer it. If I have to individually prove all the parts then don't call it an inconsistency BETWEEN two of my beliefs. The one argument is:
"Prove Calvinism."
The other is:
"Prove HOW Calvinism has the resources to address what looks to be an internal tension."
I hope you're starting to get an inkling of why your "response" was ridiculous. I mean, perhaps that kind of response would work in OTHER areas, but not the specific context I was opperating in.
There, I hope that clears things up for you."
ARMINIAN: You act as if "means" is defined differently by Calvinism and Arminianism. But it isn't. And that's why it is perfectly acceptable for me to challenge your assertion that intercessory prayer is a means to accomplishing what the prayer asks for in a deterministic system. This is why you indeed beg the question by up front assuming intercessory prayer is a means. What I am saying is that saying it is a means is invalid, and I have given reason for that. A means must actually serve as an instrument for accomplishing the end. But in a case in which someone has the ability, and decides to irresistibly cause something to happen, but to first irresistibly cause himself to be asked to do the thing, that request does not serve as an instrument to bringing about the thing that is requested. To take your tasty burger analogy and make it reflect the intercessory prayer situation, you have to add someone asking you to irresitibly cause the person to give you a bite of his tasty burger. So you decide you want a bite of the tasty burger your friend has, and you have the power to irresistibly cause others to act however you choose. So you irresistibly cause a third friend to ask you to irresistibly cause your friend with the tasty burger to give you bite of the tasty burger. Your third friend therefore asks you to do this; you then do it. Your friend asking you to irresistibly cause your friend to give you a bite of the tasty burger is simply not a means to you causing your friend with the tasty burger to give you a bite. It is just something you wanted to have happen before you irresistibly caused your friend to give you a bite of the tasty burger. It did not serve as an instrument to you doing that. It might even be related to the whole tasty burger situation. But it cannot properly be said to have been an instrument to the bringing about of what was asked for; it was not instrumental in that case. As I mentioned to Josh, there really is little difference between someone absolutely determining to do something but will only do it when he first irresistibly causes someone to ask him to do it, and someone absolutely determining to do something but will only do it when he first puts a sock puppet on his hand and irresistibly causes it to ask him to do what he has already determined he will do (i.e., asks himself to do it by means of the sock puppet), and in fact is having himself be asked to do it because he has already determined to do the thing! Having the sock puppet ask him to do it is not a means to him doing it.
MANATA: You wrote: "The point is that if God decides to irresistibly cause someone to get saved, and therefore irresisibly causes someone to pray for the person to get saved, that request God irresistibly caused to be asked to himself cannot reasonably be caused a means to the person getting saved."
This is an *assertion.* I have covered this objection NUMEROUS times in the archives. So has Steve. So has Gene. In fact, oh master of the self-refutation, YOU just begged the question. SInce this wasn't an *argument,* you just *assumed* libertarian assumptions to disprove my argument!
ARMINIAN: I don't read Triablogue posts too often, but I assume you have treated the whole means to an end issue often. But perhaps you have not considered the special case of intercessory prayer. All the examples you gave in your post to Ben were of a different sort, not the situation of a third party being irresistibly caused to ask the causer to irresistibly cause something he already had decided to do, and in fact irrersistibly causes himself to be asked to do the thing because he has already determined to do the thing.
MANATA: Same with the rest of your comments. You simply 8assume* libertarianism. You simply fail to place the dialogue in its proper context. And, you gusy should re-name your objection. Rather than saying:
(a) "Calvinis has internal problems within itssystem."
(b) You should have just said,
"We disagree with Calvinism. It is wrong for external reasons."
You can't set the debate up according to (a), then when I appropriately answer by the terms of (a), you switch to (b)!
So, I have not "declared victory" (even though you have (see your comments) and both Ben and J.C. have), I simply said you guys are chosing to not answwer my question, I am right about that, and I am letting you guys bow out.
For those who read the exchanges, all of them (even though I doubt even any one Arminian has read the entirety of my responses), there can be no question of who got the better of who.
Look, at this point, when one denies the logical translation of Jesus' statements, does not address my reasons, and repeats blunders, I am not under an obligation to carry on.
Look, I'm find ending the discussion as it stands.
I have offered about 85% substance to their 15% substance coming back at me. But they focus on the 15% "trash talk" and the discussion has no degenerated to nonsense.
If you guys are not fine where the discussion stands at this point, I fully understand. I would too if I were in your shoes. But, I do not have to continue when at this point nothing has been said to advance the discussioon, my points have not been refuted, etc. I mean, I know you may *think* you have refuted my points, but as I showed you above with your own points, perception does not = reality. I am under no obligation to try to continue to prove something to people who can't keept the argument straight, and can't seem to muster proper responses to my arguments. Indeed, I never wrote these post for you guys. I was under no allusion that you guys would try to seriously interact with the arguments. I wrote it more for Calvinists and those non-Calvinists who come here. Seems to me that goal has been fulfilled. Whining about it won't do anything. You saw how I dealt with your objection quickly and decisively. I could have done that on the main page. But I didn't. Because I'm done. I got out of this what I intended."
ARMINIAN: So given what I have said, it really is not a matter of assuming libertarianism nor failing to show Calvinism internally inconsistent. It has been shown (I believe) that your claim that intercessory prayer is a means to the end of God doing what was asked of him, that this claim is false on just about anyone's definition of means. Therefore, your whole argument falls apart. Even if you were correct about it being a means, that would not prove your overall argument necessarily. But you are wrong about this little thing. And it does your argument in as a whole.
Pulling a play from your book, I observe again that you shut down comments in the other thread in which I challenged you to respond to my comments and that you have said you are done with this. That is fine. I would want to be too if my argument was overturned by such a small yet critical point as yours is.
God bless.
*** END OF POST ***
Afterwards, Arminian posted another reply,
*** BEGINNING OF 2ND POST ***
ARMINIAN: Oh, I forgot about this coment of yours:
MANATA: "BTW, Ben, Josh, or whoever,
You would notice if you had read everything that some of the same points Josh used to say that prayer was "meaningful" or had a "point" on his scheme, were things I also said. This showed that I answered the original argument (even though I went way beyond all of that). If those things were not "points" or "meanings" for me, then they weren't for Josh and Ben and thus you guys still have the problem that prayer for you gusy is useless and pointless.
That you guys couldn't be honest enough to recognize that I answered the original argument, and then I set up Josh and got him to use some of the same answers that I did, is another reason why I do not feel compelled to continue going round 'n round with you guys.
So, glad I could answer your comment."
ARMINIAN: I have limited my involvement to your debate with Ben. Josh's comments really are irrelevant to that. I am not saying you refuted Josh. But I have focused on one small aspect of your debate with Ben, and that because it is a small issue, making it relatively easy and convenient to address, yet--and this is really the kicker--it overturns your argument as a whole. On my reading, ben's argument is pretty tight. He is not making the claim that intercessory prayer in a deterministic system is pointeless in every way. It is pointless for bringing about the accomplishment of what is asked for. In the Arminian system, it is not. It is actually able to be viewed biblically, to actually be able to bring about change and affect things.
It is fine if you want to leave the discussion now. I don't think you did answer the original argument effectively. And as I mentioned in my last post, I think you have misunderstood the force of my (and Ben's for that matter) argument.
*** END OF 2ND POST ***
My only commentary is about Manata's argument that I employed the 'same type of answers' that he did. I can only guess that he's making reference to the fact that I believe that God's word can serve to save someone who hears it, or condemn someone who doesn't (which I've believed for a long time). This fact tears down Manata's assertion that prayer can be 'meaningless' in the Synergist view, and doesn't even touch the main thrust of Arminian's argument,
If God decides to irresistibly cause something to happen (such as cause someone to get saved), and therefore irresisibly causes someone to pray for that thing to happen (such as to pray for the person to get saved), that request God irresistibly caused to be asked to himself cannot reasonably be called a means to the thing happening.
Which still stands regardless of which result occurs.
Lastly, we come to Steve Hays,
If the purpose of a warning is to deter x from doing y, and x does y anyway, then the warning was obviously ineffective. A warning cannot have a deterrent effect if it fails to effect the outcome (i.e. avoidance of the hazardous conduct).
Hays seems to be adopting the errant assumption that the warning of God must have 'failed' if it does not have a deterrent effect on the redeemed. Not so, warnings are not strictly deterrents, if the warning is not heeded, it is still quite effective in that the consequence it warns against will surely be carried out. His second major error comes in response to a statement of mine,
"Pure nonsense. To be effective as a deterrent, it need only deter one or more of those warned, not all without exception."
If a warning only succeeds some of the time, then the outcomes lies, not in the efficacy of the warning, but in the compliance or noncompliance of the agent.
Hays' displays some terrible all-or-nothing thinking of the same variety as Greg Elmquist. The old 'if a ever fails to cause b, then a can have nothing to do with b' canard. For a warning to deter someone, it must be both received and heeded, so whether it deters the agent or not is contingent upon both the warning being given and being obeyed. If the person warned does not obey it, it's not due to the warning 'failing,' but to the person disregarding it, which I address further below,
J.C. has defined his terms in such a way that, as a matter of principle (as well as practice), for a warning to be genuine, it must be possible in each and every case for the warning to be unavailing. That’s a necessary condition of what makes a warning genuine. So a 100% failure rate is consistent with a divine warning.
Again Hays equates "failure rate" with the mere possibility of not heeding the warning, since he apparently equates being 'effective' with being 'irresistible.' A warning can be a very effective deterrent (i.e. suitable to, and capable of performing its task) but still be presented to people who choose to disregard it. In the grain of one of Hays' previous analogies, a very visible road sign with strobes flashing and sirens blaring a warning to slow down due to a tight corner ahead is an extremely effective warning sign. If a fully capable driver ignores it and speeds on ahead to his death anyway, would we conclude that it was the sign's fault for not being an effective enough deterrent because it didn't end up saving the driver's life? Of course not. A clear warning can't override the decision to ignore it; the sign's not at fault, the driver is. The warnings need not be irresistible to be fully capable deterrents, and as stated above, they do not fail as warnings if they are ignored, for their consequences will be fulfilled.
When I stated,
"And Hays misses the point from my original challenge, in that the 3 major warnings cited therein are directed specifically at the saints, especially Revelation 22:19, since no unregenerate man has any part in God's kingdom (Ephesians 5:5)."
Hays replied,
ii) Also observe J.C’s exegetical ineptitude. Rev 22:19 isn’t "directed specifically at the saints." Rather, it’s generally addressed to any reader whatsoever. Cf. S. Smalley, The Revelation to John (IVP 2005), 583.
Which of course explains why it talks about their part in New Jerusalem and the tree of life being taken away. There's no doubt from the context as to whom this warning and its consequence are specifically directed.
...J.C. was never able to explain how God could foreknow the outcome if the outcome could go either way.
I guess Steve didn't realize he'd lost on this point several posts back. Let's see, God's knowledge transcends the boundaries of time, therefore, no matter what choice will be made, God already knows what it will be. Steve tried to dance around this, but was never able to explain how if the omniscient God's knowledge was not bound by time, why He would be unable to know a libertarian choice (speaking from our temporal perspective) before it is made.
Tune in next time, perhaps Manata will give us a clearer answer than evasions like, "So, perhaps they framed me."
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Triabologna
Not getting the picture.
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March 20, 2008
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It's been a week now, still no word from Triablogue about whether they used sockpuppets. We did get a response from Ben stating that he and Tom M. are real people (the post from March 13 has been updated accordingly), even graciously inviting us for coffee if we ever pass through Nashville -- which I may take him up on since I go by that way on occasion. Having resolved some of our curiousity, it makes me wonder why the members of Triablogue have not been so forthcoming with an answer.
In the meantime, we'll watch Hays run in circles again. It's kind of funny, when I called his stuff 'Triabologna,' he responds with a post called 'Thibaloney;' when I used the term 'Triahuahuas,' his latest post to me was called 'Thibochiuhuahua.' Talk about your sincerest forms of flattery, I've not heard such brilliant comebacks since fourth grade. Looks like his arguments aren't the only things that lack any originality. He starts off trying to correct my 'caricature' of Calvinism (I stated, "yet you teach a doctrine that states He would never under any circumstance actually do such a thing") that should have carried a fairly obvious meaning from the context, which raises the question of whether he believes in circumstances actually occurring that God doesn't allow.
When I argued,
"Let's examine his argument for consequences as disincentive: If consequence y won't happen until condition x occurs, and one teaches that x will absolutely never occur because God ensures that it won't, then he is also teaching that y can never occur, therefore neither x nor y are genuine possibilities as neither will, nor could ever occur. In teaching so, he undercuts any fear or caution such a consequence would incite, hence making it void by his teaching. And so despite his gimmicks and quaint analogies, Hays' insistence that ‘fear of consequences’ is a ‘means’ to our perseverance runs aground on his own doctrine once again."
Hays replied,
Of course we exercise caution since the divine promise is indexed to our avoidance of y.
Poor Thibodaux keeps confusing Calvinism with fatalism or antinomianism. In Calvinism, the outcome is not irrespective of what you do. You are not preserved in spite of doing y; rather, you were preserved from doing y. And the warning is instrumental in your avoidance of y.
Sorry Hays, there's no divine promise that no saint will ever violate the warnings delivered to them. He wants to talk caricatures, he makes a few errors:
1. We don't do y in the case I argued, we are warned against x with y as a consequent, though that by the way.
2. I never said anything about being preserved despite doing x, but that Calvinism makes both doing x and suffering y out to be not genuinely possible for the saints to whom these warnings were delivered.
Hays argued against my statement,
"Thus even if fear and coercion unto holiness were the sole intent of the consequences in God's warnings to the saints, the teaching of a doctrine that absolutely no saint can fall away directly contradicts such an intent."
with,
This is like saying that if I tell you not to eat those mushrooms because you’ll die of food poisoning should you do so, and you refrain from eating them as a result of my advice, then the warning was meaningless.
When I pointed out that I was not arguing meaninglessness in that quote, Hays shot back,
J.C. can’t keep track of his own argument. One of his criteria, in his original challenge, is that:
"Any teaching that would make any passage of scripture meaningless or of no effect is a false doctrine."
I said that I didn't mention meaninglessness in the quote Hays cited, not that I never argued it at all. Once again Hays handles the data very poorly, but that's okay, the way things are going for him, he needs all the cheap shots he can get.
I wrote:
"Refraining from eating poisonous mushrooms is not analogous with teaching that your eating them could never occur, and a warning being possible to violate does not render it ineffective."
Hays responded,
One of J.C’s problems is that, despite the rivers of ink he has wasted on the warnings of Scripture, he’s too intellectually shallow to ask himself the fundamental, preliminary question: "what is the function of a divine warning?"
Either:
i) To deter x from doing y.
Or:
ii) To inculpate x for doing y.
In Reformed theology, (i) applies to the elect, while (ii) applies to the reprobate.
a) In cases of (i), where the function of the warning lies in its deterrent value, an ineffective warning would subvert the purpose of the warning.
b) In cases of (ii), where the function is not to deter the sinner, but to either inculpate the sinner or aggravate his guilt, then the warnings serve their purpose when the sinner suffers the consequences of his defiant misbehavior.
He later states,
The warnings in Scripture don’t single out the "saints." They are addressed to Israel or the church. Israel and the church include regenerates and unregenerates, true believers, nominal believers, immature believers, reprobates, and closet apostates. There’s no one-size-fits-all referent.
And Hays misses the point from my original challenge, in that the 3 major warnings cited therein are directed specifically at the saints, especially Revelation 22:19, since no unregenerate man has any part in God's kingdom (Ephesians 5:5).
"But if our making due use of grace is entirely contingent upon God working in us so that we will do so without fail, then scripture raising the possibility of one of the redeemed falling away effectively would be bringing up the contingency of God failing by the Calvinist paradigm."
Scripture never raises the possibility that God would fail. Rather, that follows from the Arminian paradigm.
I agree with the first sentence, which is why such warnings are so disastrous for Hays' theology. By the conditional securist paradigm, God always gives us the strength we need to abide and hence never fails; if a man falls away, it is his own fault for not abiding in Christ despite being given provision to do so.
When faced with the problem,
"So if they actually will fall in if they ignore the signs, then is Hays still going to insist that we're teaching doctrinal error if we tell others that it's possible for them to fall if they ignore the warnings? The absurd balancing act Hays puts on has scripture on one hand genuinely warning the saints against falling away, yet on the other hand condemning as false teachers those who teach that saints possibly could ignore the warnings and fall away."
Hays' resorted to stating,
J.C. both begs the question and oversimplifies the question of what constitutes a "genuine" warning, under what conditions, and for whom. To say that a warning can only be genuine if it’s inutile is tendentious and counterintuitive.
He later goes as far as stating,
i) Calvinism, unlike Arminianism, doesn’t believe that God issues useless warnings. Divine warnings always have their intended effect, but they also have more than one purpose.
ii) J.C., due to his dogmatic, Arminian precommitments, nullifies the deterrent value of a warning. For him, it must always be possible to violate a warning. Thus, it’s essential to his definition of a warning that it be ineffective.
For him, a warning is pointless unless it’s ineffectual. For him, even a divine warning is meaningless unless it’s nugatory.
And the tail-chasing by Hays continues, I never argued that a warning was not genuine unless it was useless, for a warning being possible to violate does not make it ineffective, as was brought out in my last reply. This does not negate their deterrent effects, but rather my statements that they are possible for the saints to violate fully supports its use as a deterrent, as opposed to the Calvinist doctrine which concludes that such violation is not a genuine possibility for the saints. Hays goes on,
iii) Calvinism, by contrast, doesn’t equate functionality with futility. Although not all warnings are meant to deter misconduct, some warnings are meant to deter misconduct, and if, in those cases, the purpose of the warning lies in its deterrent value, then it would subvert the purpose of the warning if it failed to deter the sinner.
Pure nonsense. To be effective as a deterrent, it need only deter one or more of those warned, not all without exception. To make matters even worse for Hays, the addition of a consequent makes the warning fully effective and meaningful whether heeded or disobeyed. If one disobeys, it does not make the warning void -- the violator merely suffers the consequences as the warning states.
iv) In ethics generally, contemplating the consequences of a hypothetical course of action can, of itself, have a deterrent effect. It’s because we fear the hypothetical consequences of that action that we don’t go down that fork in the road.
v)"It’s impossible" in what respect? It’s impossible because the elect will persevere, and they persevere, in part, by taking God’s admonitions to heart.
And trying to explain the possibility of such a consequence away by stating that God would never allow the antecedent to occur is contrary to such a purpose, as we've already covered.
"He's not even dealt with the difficulties posed in the original challenge."
Is that an allusion to this?
http://www.indeathorlife.org/soteriology/calvinism/reformedchallenge.php
If so, then I’ve presented a very detailed defense of the Reformed interpretation of Heb 6.
And we only thought his arguments concerning foreknowledge were awful. I never even brought up Hebrews 6 in the challenge.
"After we exposed their cheap tactics, the Triahuahuas seem more determined than ever to try and contravene their crushing defeat with sheer volume of yapping."
Notice how Ben and J.C. are unable to muster the charitable tone which they warmly urge on their opponents. They betray their own cause when libertarians lack the willpower to live according to their own strictures.
I've said very little about Triablogue's 'tone,' I'm more concerned about their misuse of facts, which I gave my thoughts on in the Junkyard post on March 11. For all his rhetoric, Hays never does give a clear answer as to why it's gospel truth according to the purpose of God for the apostles to sincerely warn the redeemed against the possibility of falling from God's grace with the worst of consequences, but it somehow becomes false teaching when we believe that what they warn against could actually occur.
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Triabologna
Not getting the picture.
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March 18, 2008
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Almost a week since we asked Triablogue as to whether they used sockpuppets, and still no response to the question, though Manata has gone as far as insinuating that Arminian is myself or Ben (for the record, neither Kangaroodort nor I have ever used sockpuppets). Bridges seems to think I'm a Wesleyan, and I'm content to let him continue believing that -- it makes his writing even more comical. And then there's Hays: He's out to put in his parting nips, but ends up just chasing his tail again. He goes after some of my quotes,
"If God's purpose in giving such warnings was to make us live holy unto Him by indicating that if we walk away from Him, He will cast us away, yet you teach a doctrine that states He would never under any circumstance actually do such a thing, then have you not undone the holy fear which God's word was meant to instill in the hearts of His people and again made it of no effect?"
A straw man argument. Calvinism doesn’t take the position that God would never cast us away under any circumstances. The warnings are conditional. If we did such things, God would cast us away.
It’s just that those circumstances will not eventuate. And the warnings are part of what restrains us from doing such things. They serve as a disincentive to apostasy. So the worst-case scenario does not play out-thanks, in part, to the fear of consequences.
So the warnings are conditional, Christians violating them is simply impossible ("those circumstances will not eventuate"). I was of course referring to circumstances which God would actually allow, Hays just has no better answer than playing word games. Let's examine his argument for consequences as disincentive:
If consequence y won't happen until condition x occurs, and one teaches that x will absolutely never occur because God ensures that it won't, then he is also teaching that y can never occur, therefore neither x nor y are genuine possibilities as neither will, nor could ever occur. In teaching so, he undercuts any fear or caution such a consequence would incite, hence making it void by his teaching. And so despite his gimmicks and quaint analogies, Hays' insistence that "fear of consequences" is a "means" to our perseverance runs aground on his own doctrine once again.
"Thus even if fear and coercion unto holiness were the sole intent of the consequences in God's warnings to the saints, the teaching of a doctrine that absolutely no saint can fall away directly contradicts such an intent."
This is like saying that if I tell you not to eat those mushrooms because you’ll die of food poisoning should you do so, and you refrain from eating them as a result of my advice, then the warning was meaningless.
For J.C., a warning can only be meaningful if it’s ineffective. That’s an odd stipulation.
Sheesh, chock-full of errors. I didn't even mention meaninglessness in the quote he cites, refraining from eating poisonous mushrooms is not analogous with teaching that your eating them could never occur, and a warning being possible to violate does not render it ineffective.
When I wrote,
"Then why would scripture even bring up the contingency of His failure or unfaithfulness?"
Steve replied,
Scripture never brings up the contingency of divine infidelity or failure. It does bring up the contingency of human infidelity or failure.
But also states,
Perseverance involves, among other things, the due use of the means of grace. And God has given his elect a heart to use the means of grace.
But if our making due use of grace is entirely contingent upon God working in us so that we will do so without fail, then scripture raising the possibility of one of the redeemed falling away effectively would be bringing up the contingency of God failing by the Calvinist paradigm. Just more of the same irrelevant quibbling he's been offering.
"So if God's purpose in issuing warnings with the worst possible consequences is to be compared to bogus, yet highly effective road signs, then how is saying 'Don't worry, those signs are feigned, they're just made to scare you, it's not actually possible for you to fall in' not going against that purpose?"
Notice how he always oversimplifies the explanation. To return to my illustration, the road signs would only be bogus if the bridge wasn’t washed out. But if the bridge is, indeed, washed out, and you disregarded the cautionary signage, then your car will plunge into the river below and you will drown. It’s a pity that J.C. can only keep one idea in his head at a time.
So if they actually will fall in if they ignore the signs, then is Hays still going to insist that we're teaching doctrinal error if we tell others that it's possible for them to fall if they ignore the warnings?
The absurd balancing act Hays puts on has scripture on one hand genuinely warning the saints against falling away, yet on the other hand condemning as false teachers those who teach that saints possibly could ignore the warnings and fall away. His evasions cannot get around the obvious problem for his views that's been posed already:
"Apparently, warning actual saints against the possibility of falling away is gospel truth when the apostles proclaim it, but now our affirming the viability of that same truth constitutes deep doctrinal error."
The other problem he has is that the 'warnings as means' argument by itself cannot account for the consequences attached to the warnings should they be violated (why give consequences to a warning that can't be violated by those to whom it was given?), but if he teaches that the purpose of such consequences is to spur us to perseverance, then teaching that it isn't possible for us to suffer such consequences mitigates that purpose (why fear a consequent with an antecedent that could never occur?), and hence he is making them of no effect, as was stated originally. He's not even dealt with the difficulties posed in the original challenge, much less added anything more substantial than trying to confuse the issue.
So we leave Hays where we found him: chasing his tail. After we exposed their cheap tactics, the Triahuahuas seem more determined than ever to try and contravene their crushing defeat with sheer volume of yapping. They're welcome to keep trying. People who won't deal straight aren't worth much of our time, effort, or interest, since they've already lost by showing how hollow their own words are; or as Paul writes,
Similarly, if anyone competes as an athlete, he does not receive the victor's crown unless he competes according to the rules. (2 Timothy 2:5)
But that's okay, they can always just go cut their own laurels and pretend.
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Triabologna
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March 13, 2008
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Before I begin, I'll give a brief primer on 'Internet Sockpuppets.' The term 'Sockpuppet' is net slang for an alternate identity used for purposes of deception. Brad Stone and Matt Ritchel of the New York Times comment,
"This digital-age deception has a name, "sock-puppeting," and a precise definition - the act of creating a fake online identity to praise, defend or create the illusion of support for one's self, allies or company." ("The Hand That Controls the Sock Puppet Could Get Slapped," July 16, 2007)
Much different from a normal nickname or screen name for purposes of anonymity from a neutral party, sockpuppets are designed to create the illusion of someone else entirely, usually for self-promotion, but variants such as 'strawman sockpuppets' also exist for the purpose of making the competition look bad. Over the years, even some high-profile political and financial leaders have been "busted" for using sockpuppets to promote themselves or their interests inequitably. When explaining what a sockpuppet was to my brother, I commented that such a tactic used to 'win arguments' on forums and the like was both dishonest and unfair, which being a rather obvious observation on my part was met with, "No! You think?"
Having said all this, I'd like to turn our attention to our recent discussions with Paul Manata, and what was apparently a swarm of Triablogue supporters on Arminian Perspectives. On the threads I started to notice a few interesting coincidences between the way Manata writes, and the way that several of the posters in our recent exchanges write. There's coincidences in wording and argument structure here
Paul Manata:
"I was pointing out the double standard here. I was pointing out that the comments in this combox shouldn't be taken seriously."
and here
Katie F.:
"With all due respect, it is hard to take you boys seriously when you are so obviously biased and employ a double standard."
Same argument, similar terms employed ("double standard," "seriously"), both laid out for the same stated reason. Katie's sign off was a
bit peculiar too,
See here
~~Katie~~
Which is reminiscent of someone else we've seen, here, here, and here.
~PM
And let's not forget here
~Paul
The similarities between Paul and Katie F.'s writing get even more interesting, in the same post Katie writes,
"As opposed to J.C. 'nailing the coffen shut' on Manata, I suppose?"
Not much unusual there, except she misquotes me and employs a rather unusual misspelling of 'coffin.' Well I spotted a URL on the Puritan Board, and happened to find a quote by a certain 'Paul Manata,'
"Now for the nail in the coffen."
Hmmmm...looks like Katie's been taking spelling lessons from Paul, or vice-versa. Paul's moniker on that board was 'Tom Bombadil,' a
reference to Lord of the Rings, and it seems other posters to Arminian Perspectives also enjoy fanboy themes, in this box we find,
Boba Fett:
"Hi all,
See Mr. J.C. Thibodaux get absolutely ruined in the discussion thread here:
http://triablogue.blogspot.com/2008/03/whats-point.html
Cheers!"
And here's another one by Manata,
"Not because I'm smarter or better than you, because the position I defend is biblically and philosophically superior to yours. That's it.
Cheers!"
Even the spacing is the same. Speaking of space, I'm about to see stars from several quotes by Manata on this thread:
"But, who cares. Everyone knew *that.*"
"I didn;t say you used the *word* 'means.' But your comments were *functionally* equivolent to our argument."
"So, no one can come unless the father draw *him*, AND Jesus will raise *him* up on the last day."
And on the same thread, a Mr. Boba Fett chimes in,
"I didn't see anything, actually, that would lead me to believe that those two verses actually *taught* LFW. Now, I grant that you might
*read* those verses that way. But to say that they *teach* LFW is over reaching, to say the least, my fine feathered friend."
Quite a few asterisks for emphasis. Now I've used them myself for as much before, but I don't ever recall that many in one sitting. The reference
to "fine feathered friend" sounds vaguely like a certain member of Triablogue calling me a 'daux daux' back in December, which seems a bit odd coming from this Boba Fett character that I'd apparently never spoken to until very recently. Boba then questions us on a bit on logic in the same combox,
"Would you mind showing us all how, say if God told us you would do X, you could do not-X."
Interesting wording, made even more interesting by the words Manata wrote on this post,
"Indeed, if Swedenborg's god is omniscient, then if he knows that you'll do X in the future, then you will do X in the future. Is not-X a real
possibility?"
Same capitalization and punctuation for X and not-X. Let's let Paul shed a bit more light on the issue.
"So, according to your own lights, you guys should be fearful."
Interesting expression, and perfectly consistent with his comments in another post,
"P.S. Sorry if my statements "bother" you, but dems the breaks. By my lights, the only "bothersome" thing you can complain about is my
Cap'n Kangaroo title and picture. I thought it was funny."
as well as this post by someone going under the name 'Ken',
"By my lights, the inconsistency was removed."
Another anonymous shot back to Ken,
"Oh Ken, my darling, is it really you or just another one of Paul Manata's dishonest poses?
Love,
Barbie"
'Ken' was not forthcoming in answering this question.
Here's the opinion of one going by 'Not ArminianorCalvinist' to Kangaroodort,
"I dunno Ben, looks to be a landslide victory for Manata...though I hate to admit that. I think "Out of your league" is the term that applies
here."
'Out of his league?' Ben was debating him, not dating him. But 'Not ArminianorCalvinist' isn't the only one who thinks that Paul is out of his competition's 'league,'
Paul Manata:
"They are so intellectually sloppy and the arguments so bad, that i don't have the time. My posts should show you that you're out of your
league."
Here's another one by an anonymous 'Joe' on the debate between Manata and myself, he writes:
"Loosing a debate though does not shatter my belief in Arminianism, sometimes the other side wins and sometimes not."
And then later, there's this bit by a certain 'Tom M.,'
"No worries though, it's not like the end of the world or anything like that. In debates you win some and you loose some."
Same resigned declaration of victory for Manata, same sympathetic tone, and the same type of misspelling for 'lose/losing.' While this is a
fairly common misspelling, Manata is no exception,
"You know, like those kids on the playground who get skunked in pick-up football games and have to resort to the "he cheated" tactic in
order to make them feel better about loosing, or to get an advantage."
Then we just get the comments that are too silly to even sound real, almost like paid advertisements. Here's another by Tom M.,
"I want to thank the anonymous who posted the link 'For those wondering what Scripture says' this was good stuff. This is what we as a group of believers should do, look to what they Scripture say and stop all of this bickering."
The link was to a rebuttal to Kangaroodort by Gene Bridges.
Then there's another 'Ben' who frequents Triablogue's comboxes, and argues in a manner quite similar to Manata, despite his claims of only recent conversion. He also makes comments that push the limits to fanboy critical mass:
"YIKES!!! What a complete beat down these poor Arminians have taken. Of course, they will claim victory and fan base will comfort them and tell them how great they were going against the mean Calvinist's at Triablogue.
This has been very informative and I thank all of you for the work that you do. It is hard for someone like me to argue since I am new to the faith, but man you guys know your stuff."
And,
"Thank all of you for teaching a humble heart and for exposing the errors of Arminianism."
To quote Coach Z, "Very Un-suspicious."
A bit of info on the profiles for these posters:
Katie F. profile was created March 2008, extremely basic profile
Boba Fett profile was created January 2008, bio is fictional
Ben profile created October 2007, no information available
Tom M., Ken, Joe, and Not ArminianorCalvinist were strictly anonymous comments; Katie F. was anonymous at first, notice the account popped up just this month. Quite a string of very secretive blog commenters there. I've noticed through the course of our exchange that Paul seems to rely heavily on comments from the comboxes to validate his arguments.
".... as some non-reformed guys have said in our comboxes: "I see you handled Thibodaux." Of course Arminians and Calvinists will usually side with their own side, but when I get admitted non-reformed guys to admit your case got "handled," I take that as a good indication of what unbiased people thought of the two arguments."
Yeah, there's a clincher for you. While coincidences in writing styles do come up here and there, I think I'm starting to understand that feeling teachers get when looking at homework that looks just a bit too much alike. Perhaps there is another solution, maybe Paul is teaching them all his writing style, but far too many similarities are popping up to simply write them off as mere chance. It's already known that Paul has posted under fake names before, as has come out in the combox of one of their posts
"Pinturo said:
I think its really lame when people write a post, and then post as 'sock puppets' to illicit responses.
Lame.
Paul Manata said:
I didn't post as a sock puppet to illicit responses. Glad you know my intentions, you must think you have invisible psychic powers.
Anyway, I came back today and read my comments and noted it was a bunch of kids "yawing," thus implicating them that they hadn't even read it.
Anyway, I've been waiting for something substantive. I think it's lame when people don't bother to post substantive comments.
Lame.
pinturo said:
Paul...you know that you've done the 'sock puppet' thing in the past, whether or not you did this specific time. You're an admitted 'blogger-liar,' so people have a hard time knowing waht to believe when it comes to your words.
Or your many alter-egos."
A post from 'Simon Cowll' on the same thread states,
So what if I feel the need to post under multiple names on my blog postings? Its the sign of a healthy, well-adjusted individual, didn't you know that?
You loose again.
I suppose that makes him a 'looser.'
The real question then is whether he's been posting in like manner throughout our exchanges. So I'm asking Mr. Manata and the other members of Triablogue directly: Have you posted under different names when making comments pertaining to the exchanges with Kangaroodort and/or myself?
Update (03/18/2008):
'Ben' affirms that neither he nor Tom M. are sockpuppets, we'll take him at his word. Indeed, the evidence for him being one was the weakest, though some of his comments still made us a bit skeptical at first. The purpose of this inquiry was not to accuse him, but to get to the truth of this matter, and his confirmation is part of what we seek to uncover. There are still several extremely suspicious posters that are unaccounted for, and there's so far been no word from Paul Manata or the rest of Triablogue as to whether they've used sockpuppets or not.
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Triabologna
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March 11, 2008
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*Sigh* More stuff by Triablogue. This time they pull a major foul -- even for stuff on the garbage heap.
Paul Manata keeps beating the John 6 drum,
And, how could Jesus say this? Does the Father peer into the future and see who "comes" by their own undetermined free will, and then "give" these people to Jesus and say, "Here, I am giving you these people?" That seems stupid. If they "came," to Jesus on their own then it seems as if the "coming" would have been prior to the "giving;" yet, Jesus says the "giving" is prior to the coming!
Paul apparently misses that I do in fact believe in election before the world began, and that our being drawn is necessary before we come to Christ. We are elect according to the foreknowledge of God, and must be both drawn and taught by the Father before He gives us to Christ and we believe in Him, which is congruent with John 6, and thus it does not lend itself to Manata's rigid equations. Paul's argument that God would be 'wasting His time' showing grace to one who would not believe by the Synergist view has been thoroughly shredded (since it will have an effect either way), and the refutation to his original point that he was pressing against Ben comes from a mutual friend of ours who goes by the moniker, "Arminian." When Manata wrote,
"To clarify, I claimed that if God determiend that S be saved in time by the prayers of S*, then the *whole package* comes together. So, it *does matter* if we pray."
Arminian countered,
This rerally does not rescue your claim. First, you are begging the question by trying to define intercessory prayer as a means in your argument. The point is that if God decides to irresistibly cause someone to get saved, and therefore irresisibly causes someone to pray for the person to get saved, that request God irresistibly caused to be asked to himself cannot reasonably be caused a means to the person getting saved. Determining both things in a package does not cause them to be related as means and end. Someone can plan all sorts of thimgs together as a package of what they want to happen, but that does not render the individual parts to relate as means and end. Nor does arbitrarily assigning something a role as means make it one unless it actually serves as an instrument to bring about the end.
Pretty much cinching it. Arminian also drew an excellent parallel to Manata's model of prayer,
There really is little difference between someone absolutely determining to do something but will only do it when he first irresistibly causes someone to ask him to do it, and someone absolutely determining to do something but will only do it when he first puts a sock puppet on his hand and irresistibly causes it to ask him to do what he has already determiend he will do (i.e., asks himself to do it by means of the sock puppet), and in fact is having himself be asked to do it because he has already determined to do the thing!
Steve Hays also gives it another go, and steps way over the line.
Speaking on Jeremiah 32:35,
Boy, J.C. really doesn't understand a fairly simple anthropomorphism, does he? To apply a distinctly human idiom (e.g. "It never entered my mind") to God is a classic case of anthropomorphic discourse.
No, it's a simple expression that God did not desire or decree such an action, as I've stated before. Additionally, Hays' defense effectively treats anthropomorphisms as some vague, foggy area that is mitigated into nothingness; what he misses is that 'anthropomorphisms are still expressing a comparable idea (e.g. the 'hand of God' represents His power, God repenting means God turning away from what He proposed, etc.), so God desiring that Jerusalem come to Him and denying that Judah's committing idolatry ever entered His heart is plainly incompatible with saying that He actually deeply desired and precisely engineered both from the beginning.
To the contrary, Isaiah's claim moves from the general to the specific. The dependence of foreknowledge on foreordination in this instance is just a special case of a universal principle. Read Oswalt's exegesis for the supporting argument.
Thanks, I've read the book itself. It supports no such claim.
To say that God is partly temporal and partly atemporal simply combines the difficulties of both positions, for reasons I already gave.
The 'difficulties' he presented don't really carry any weight, as the divine has already entered the temporal in the person of Christ. Christ existed in time with a divine nature, and therefore, it isn't a problem even from a divine perspective to say that He "often" longed to gather the people of Jerusalem.
Notice his little shellgame. When I point out the temporal constraints on knowledge, he shifts to divine atemporality. When I point out the atemporal constraints on knowledge, he shifts to divine temporality.
Atemporal constraints on knowledge?
ii) Anyway, we can reject the "forelove" connotation, if J.C. has a problem with that, and simply take it to mean that God chose them beforehand. That's the basic import of the verb. And you don't have to be a Calvinist to say that. Read the analysis of Witherington (Arminian) or Fitzmyer (Jesuit).
Nor does one have to agree with their analysis. Proginisko/Prognosis also mean simply to have knowledge beforehand, the strongest argument for which I think comes from 1 Peter 1:2, which employs the noun form Prognosis, and would not likely carry that particular connotation of a Hebrew verb.
Notice the bait-and-switch tactic. "Drawing" and "wooing" are not synonymous concepts. One doesn't "woo" a person with ropes and cords—unless J.C. has a kinky notion of courtship or dating.
They can be, if one is drawn with cords of love (they being a metaphor, as Steve has so kindly pointed out).
And, as Gene pointed out, this chapter is an extended metaphor for the Exodus. God didn't deliver his people from Egypt by "wooing" them or "wooing" the Pharaoh. If you think the ten plagues, the fiery snakes, &c. are a form of wooing, then I hate to think how J.C. would define coercion.
Incorrect, God did woo His people, and they obeyed His voice, and were thus delivered from bondage by Him. Indeed when the good news of God freeing them was proclaimed,
And the people believed: and when they heard that the LORD had visited the children of Israel, and that he had looked upon their affliction, then they bowed their heads and worshipped. (Exodus 4:31)
God's drawing Israel with His love is not mutually exclusive with His bringing them out of Egypt by His power or afflicting the Egyptians.
Hays makes a big deal out of me not answering every one of his arguments. For starters, a lot of his 'points' don't really solidify his case, and I won't waste time shooting down all of them when one will suffice. Secondly, Hays has shown himself unworthy of much attention since in his haste to 'destroy the opposition,' he's very badly misrepresented data to try and discredit me. When he made an actual argument out of the "libertarian free will genie," that cemented his place on my 'take serious list' somewhere between Joel Osteen and Dial-the-Truth Ministries. But he's shot his credibility even worse than that in this exchange: when Hays cited Welty, I linked to my articles for general responses. Hays cited my article on Granville-Sharp's rule, stating that it was irrelevant since Welty didn't employ it. I noted,
"Which I wasn't answering in that specific article. Not sure what Steve was getting at there."
To which Hays replied,
J.C. can't remember his own argument. He was attempting to deflect the force of Welty's arguments by referring the reader to some stuff on his website: "I deal with the usual Calvie objections to foreknowledge in the articles on my site."
Now, however, he admits that his articles are irrelevant to Welty's specific arguments.
This is plainly misrepresenting facts, and an extremely cheap shot at that. My articles on foreknowledge deal with the most common objections to the idea of foreknowledge in relation to election being defined as prescience, including the foreordination/forelove interpretations as well as the appeal to Granville-Sharp's rule in Acts 2:23. I never said ALL of my articles were relevant to what exactly what Welty wrote (Since not all of them are -- does Hays think my counter-cult arguments are supposed to be tailored to answering arguments from Welty too?). Steve twists this very basic detail into, "Now, however, he admits that his articles are irrelevant to Welty's specific arguments." Even concerning this subdomain's title, he states,
Well, since the Arminian position lacks either exegetical or logical consistency, it's not surprising that it also lacks moral consistency.
You know, I've been called quite a few names by Triablogue, including some that I don't think Jesus would have approved of (e.g. Gene calling me a 'simpleton,' in defiance of Matthew 5:22). I don't think merely calling their posts 'junk' and 'baloney,' or their logic 'ridiculous' ranks as a moral lapse, as the case of the either side is fair game for honest, and yes, even harsh criticism. I've put up pretty well with Triablogue's humor, and traded bits of sarcasm with them, but when they started to do things like twist my words into saying that my beliefs 'aren't associated with the teachings of jesus,' in what was clearly slander, I figured something was very wrong. Hays has merely confirmed my suspicions by his behavior in this matter. Manata is quick to claim that he's simply playing by the same rules as everybody else, but a little mutual banter and smack-talk is nowhere near the same thing as twisting the truth to smear someone else. We are playing by different rules entirely, and the rules I live by are incompatible with theirs. With this kind of behavior, several of the members of Triablogue have thoroughly earned the title of 'contentious men' for themselves: they've shown themselves incapable of fair debate and unworthy of more than cursory effort, as they apparently have much bigger problems than the finer points of soteriology. With that, we toss another one on the junk pile.
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Triabologna
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March 7, 2008
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Congratulations to Paul Manata and Steve Hays of Triablogue on being our first entries for disposal! Paul still can't get over the fact that the prophets were sent to turn the people back to God,
Nevertheless they were disobedient And rebelled against You, Cast Your law behind their backs And killed Your prophets, who testified against them To turn them to Yourself; And they worked great provocations. (Nehemiah 9:26)
But he tries some interesting evasions,
I had claimed that if the things God did had no positive effect, they could still have a negative one. This verse does not tell us that for those who did not listen, the prophets words served as evidence against them and their hard hearts. Let's read Jesus words:
[cites several scriptures, Matt 23:29, 37; Luke 16:19]
We can see that the rejection of Moses and the prophets was enough to justify the judgment of hell. This should be easy enough to see. The prophets were mouthpieces for God. To reject them was to reject God himself. Rejecting God himself is a basis for judgment. Therefore, to reject the prophets was a basis for judgment. The reason this is argued is simply. God doesn't do anything that he knows is pointless. God knows who will listen and who will not. God has reasons for both sides of the coin.
Obviously, He sends His word to save men, but if they won't listen, it will serve to condemn them, or as Christ said,
Whosoever shall fall upon that stone shall be broken; but on whomsoever it shall fall, it will grind him to powder. (Luke 20:18)
I think Manata's found his own 'futility' solution.
J.C. thinks the 'turning back' part is opposed to the judgment motif I appealed to. In fact, it isn't:
I didn't say it was, but neither does heaping condemnation on them for not listening negate the fact that they were sent to turn Israel back to God -- it can serve as either depending on the response; saving primarily, and condemning if not heeded.
ii) The text says: No one is able to come unless the father draws him and I will raise him up on the last day. Are those hims the same him or not? If they are the same, all drawn are raised. It's really rather simple.
It potentially can be the same him, hence it's stated that he can come.
Jesus disagrees with your claim: John6:37 All that the Father gives me will come to me, and whoever comes to me I will never drive away.
Equating drawing with being given. No dice.
You're not even engaging my point. Again, the point is in the conjunction. John 6:44 is saying (~p --> ~q) & r. This is logically equivalent to (q-->p) & r.
Because the starting premise on which he bases his logic is unsubstantiated. Paul tries his equation again, expecting a different outcome. As usual, he's stuck with no way of inextricably tying the resurrection with being drawn rather than coming to Christ; or as Steve Witzki notes,
Jesus could have said, "No one can believe in me unless the Father who sent me draws him, and the one who believes in Me (in response to this drawing), I will raise him up on the last day." But since he already affirmed to his listeners that they must come to or believe in Him in order to receive the promises, it was not necessary to emphasize it here. Jesus' concern was to emphasize God's sovereign initiative that precedes and enables the human response of faith.
Leaving Paul's insistence as merely that. Toss that one on the junk pile.
Then Hays goes at it; concerning Jeremiah 32:35, He writes,
Except that that's not what the text actually says. Remember, this was one of J.C's prooftexts for his own position. He volunteered this text to prove his point. Now, however, he's running away from the actual wording of the text by paraphrasing it to eliminate the offending clause. J.C. only wanted to use the preceding clause about how God didn't command them to do this. But the text says more than that. It goes on to say "nor did it enter my mind." That's why this is a favorite prooftext for open theism. Since, however, J.C. is an Arminian rather than an open theist, he believes in divine omniscience, including divine foreknowledge.
Boy, Hays really doesn't understand a fairly simple idiom, does he? As I've stated to Richard Coords,
"It's hard to imagine what else He could have been expressing. A good parallel is a possible answer to the question, 'have you ever cheated on your wife?' I could rightly answer, 'No, I wouldn't think of it.' Which idiomatically is true even if the actual thought of such a possibility had crossed my mind in the past, or even hard temptation had been placed in front of me. The thought expressed in 'I wouldn't think of it' is not that the possibility had never occurred to me, but that doing such a thing was far from my thoughts and intentions. Whereas if I actually had cheated on my wife or was planning to, such an expression would be a lie, in that there is not even a figurative or idiomatic sense in which it could be true. Calvinism simply has God saying, 'It never entered my mind for you to do this....but I actually did decree it all from the beginning.' "
There's no reason to stretch this into some convoluted anthropomorphism, as this is a pretty simple expression that God in no way desired Israel's sin, or as Richard added,
God is clearly denying responsibility, rather than knowledge.
Which is a perfectly viable reading of the text as opposed to Hays' false dilemma of 'Calvinism or Mormonism.' So to answer Hays' hollow charges, recognizing basic expressions is not 'running away from the actual wording,' but rather taking the words in their context. Of course speaking contrary to his own logic, Hays should know that I can't 'run' from a meaning, as meanings don't have spatial coordinates. Oh, wait, that was a fairly simple expression, wasn't it?
Predestination doesn't need to be stated in every verse of Scripture for predestination to be applicable to a verse like Jer 32.
Of course not, I simply contest that Hays version of predestination is unsupported anywhere biblically, and is flatly contradicted here.
i) It's sufficient to believe in creation ex nihilo if that's what the Bible teaches. The analogy with LFW would only work if that is also taught in Scripture.
Which we just covered above, hence his objections on the basis of us not knowing how divine foreknowledge works are pointless.
Hays also says a bit about foreknowledge,
If he "knows perfectly well what will happen regardless of the possibilities," then the possibilities aren't live possibilities. Only one possibility is actually in play.
Hays is essentially saying, 'only what will occur is an actual possibility', which of course begs the question of determinism. He uses this reasoning to make events out to be contingent on foreknowledge again,
Suppose that God could, indeed, foreknow the last-minute change of heart. By knowing what will happen, the outcome is unchangeable. A last-minute change doesn't change the outcome. For the outcome is whatever will be.
And again,
If an agent earlier intended to do A, but changed his mind at the last minute and did B instead, God foreknew B all along, so the agent isn't free to do A instead of B. If the occurrence of B is an object of knowledge, then it cannot fail to be other than B. B must obtain.
And again,
That's not responsive to my objection. If, *for whatever reason*, God knows it, then it cannot turn out otherwise. So even if, for the sake of argument, we accept J.C.'s causal order, God's knowledge of the outcome renders the outcome certain. Hence, the human agent isn't free to do otherwise.
iii) The Bible grounds divine foreknowledge in God's knowledge of his own plan for the world (e.g. Isa 46:10-11). Cf. J. Oswalt, The Book of Isaiah: Chapters 40-66 (Eerdmans 1998), 236-37.
Not exclusively.
a) If, on the one hand, God is temporal, then that undermines divine foreknowledge (for reasons already given).
He can 'step into' time, so to speak, he isn't bound by it.
b) If, on the other hand, God is atemporal, then that undermines libertarian freedom (for reasons already given).
Which only works out if one assumes determinism as a necessity.
c) And it also undermines divine foreknowledge (for reasons already given).
Same.
About Luke 13:34 he states,
The viewpoint which Christ is assuming in Lk 13:34 is not the viewpoint of a thirty-year-old man. Rather, it's the viewpoint of Yahweh. The whole history of God's dealings with stiff-necked Israel lies before his mind. And he personally identifies with that God's-eye perspective. So this statement reflects the divine viewpoint. And J. C. said that God is atemporal. I'm merely answering him on his own grounds.
Translation: "What? I'm just taking his quote out of context?" As I've pointed out before, is that God can enter time and perform actions temporally as well. In other words, He can perform things temporally, He's simply not bound by time, so it still works out even from a divine viewpoint despite Hays burying his head in the ground.
iii) Waiving (ii), if God can clearly see the future, then the future cannot be otherwise. For if the future could be otherwise, due to the freedom of billions of human agents (who can instantiate alternate possibilities), then what God would see is not the actual future (i.e. what *will* happen), but a multitude of possible futures (i.e. what *might* happen).
Again applying temporal constraints to knowledge that transcends time.
Concerning my take on foreknowledge, Hays writes,
"And I think it a pretty sticky position to call something unknowable for a completely omniscient God."
Of course, that's patently sophistical. It begs the question of whether Arminian theology is entitled to make that claim in the first place.
That God's completely omniscient? I'm perfectly entitled to make such a claim.
Hays also talks a bit about language,
It's obvious that J.C. has no grasp of lexical semantics. Usage, not etymology, determines the meaning of a word. In covenantal settings, yada is an idiomatic synonym for choice. Due to the influence to Septuagintal usage on NT usage, this carries over into the NT. The addition of the prefix makes it mean "to choose beforehand" in covenantal settings.
Hays falls into his own trap of "usage, not etymology, determines the meaning of a word" in taking his particular view of 'gnosis' and flatly assuming that 'prognosis' consistently carries the same connotation in 'covenant settings.' Even in covenant settings, 'yada' doesn't necessarily imply choosing, can mean cognitive knowledge as well (see Isaiah 29:24, for instance).
"If 'foreknow' in relation to election actually means 'foreordain' in every case, then what in the world does 'predestinate' mean?"
John Murray answered that question a long time ago. "'Foreknew' focuses attention upon the distinguishing love of God whereby the sons of God ere elected. But it does not inform us of the destination to which those thus chosen are appointed. It is precisely that information that the ‘he also foreordained' supplies, and it is by no means superfluous 'to be conformed to the image of his Son', J. Murray, The Epistle to the Romans (Eerdmans 1982), 318.
Which essentially states that it means 'forelove,' which I show evidence against in a separate article (i.e. 'prognosis' doesn't carry with it any connotations of special, relational knowledge).
The material I cited from Welty doesn't invoke the Granville-Sharp rule to make his case. Hence, J.C's counterargument, even if valid, is irrelevant.
Which I wasn't answering in that specific article. Not sure what Steve was getting at there.
ii)'Bands' are not a metaphor for wooing unless J.C. learned about dating from a Dominatrix.
"I drew them with cords of a man, with bands of love" plainly is, despite Hays lame attempts to downplay it as such.
Rather, what we have in Hosea is an extended metaphor in which God assume the role of the faithful husband to a faithless wife. And we must make due allowance for the anthropomorphic touches which such a characterization entails.
Which doesn't change the fact that it portrays God drawing people by His love, my original point.
My conclusion was meant to be ridiculous inasmuch as I was performing as reductio ad absurdum on J.C's claim. Nice to see that J.C. confirms the success of my argument.
Libertarian free will giving me the power to change absolutely anything I want as opposed to merely contrary choice was an actual argument? Wow, that's even sillier than it being mockery.
Once again, J.C. has to add a qualification which he didn't include in his original formulation.
It's not my fault that Hays refuses to understand the simplest of contexts or expressions. Only one place for garbage like that: Toss another one on the junk pile.
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