Triabologna
Not getting the picture.
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April 3, 2008
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Hays continues to press his awful view of the term 'effective,' with predictably laughable results, but we finally turn on the hydraulic press on this load of his garbage. When I stated,
"Going back to the parallel of a radio tower, the tower's job truly is to send signals for the radios to receive-and it's absurd to call it 'ineffective' if a radio is broken or turned off and stops receiving signal."
Hays replied,
This is just a bait-and-switch tactic on J.C’s part. If the *intent* of the radio tower is to accomplish x, and it fails to accomplish x, then the tower failed to achieve it’s intended effect.
Which is only 'ineffective' in Hays' 'head-in-the-sand effective=irresistible' sense, for the tower has not ceased to be an effective transmitter.
When I pointed out that even of someone does ignore God's warnings, they are still effective deterrents in that others do heed them. He responds,
That is not evidence to the contrary. Those that heed it do so not because the warning secured or insured their avoidance of the hazard. For, according to libertarianism, even in the case of those who heed the warning, they were equally free to flout the warning. So the warning, itself, is otiose in Arminian theology.
That's right, even when the warnings do deter people, by Hays' definition, they're 'ineffective' because they don't irresistibly deter those warned, exactly the fallacy I pegged him on. Thanks Hays, we agree with the concept that they don't irresistibly produce effect, but they are effective in that they can produce effect in those who take heed to them.
And what’s the proper definition of efficacy? In context, if God meant x to achieve y, and x fails to achieve y, then x is inefficacious.
In context? Oh of course, Hays is simply writing in the context of what he wants the word to mean. I am referring to something capable of producing effect under the right external conditions (such that a functioning radio tower is effective at broadcasting a station to its listeners, though the effect being achieved is still contingent upon their radios actually functioning), Hays is obviously wandering off somewhere else in equivocating the term as irresistibility. I'm sure on some planet where traffic violations are not considered primarily due to irresponsible drivers, but rather to signs that are 'ineffective' because they don't irresistibly cause obedience, Hays' logic is probably deemed very sound. The weakness to his argument is: this is Earth.
Hays wanted to argue that God intending a thing for us and providing the means to do it rendered God incompetent if we did not follow along. To counter, I cited 1 Corinthians 10:13,
No temptation has overtaken you except such as is common to man; but God is faithful, who will not allow you to be tempted beyond what you are able, but with the temptation will also make the way of escape, that you may be able to bear it. (1 Corinthians 10:13)
Indicating that God won't let us be tempted beyond what we are able to endure, thus making a way of escape with the intent that we be able to overcome temptation ("that you may be able to bear it"). The fact that saints don't always follow in God's provision plainly demonstrates that what God intends for our good can be rejected by us to our detriment. Thus, since failure to embrace God's provision is due to our decision, not God's, then it speaks nothing of God's competence, simply that He chooses not to force an effect. Hays replied,
J.C. continues to press his diversionary tactic. Even if, for the sake of argument, we were to grant his Arminian misinterpretation of 1 Cor 10:13, the conditions of a "provision" are not the same thing as the conditions of a "warning."
and,
i) Once again, J.C. is trying to change the subject. This is irrelevant to the question of whether an unsuccessful deterrent is effective; if not, then in what sense did God intend that result?
Despite Hays' attempts at at rebuttal, the same principle still runs through both,
God gives the saints warnings with the intent of deterring us from wickedness, but if we do not heed them, we suffer the consequences He lists.
God gives the saints a way out of every temptation with the intent that we endure it, but if we do not follow it, we fall into sin and suffer its consequences.
Since Christians do fall into sin sometimes, then by Hays' reasoning, God's provision that He gives to keep us from sin would be 'ineffective,' since it does not net the result intended every time. The fact that we do fail sometimes despite a way of escape being provided denotes that God intends that we overcome sin, but does not unconditionally instantiate it; He instead provides adequate means that we can follow to attain what He desires of us in spite of His foreknowledge that we will not always succeed.
"If the warning failed to restrain the agent, then it didn’t produce the intended effect-in which case it was an exercise in futility."
Futility would indicate no effect at all, but the secondary effect (e.g. God intends we 'turn or burn') would be greater condemnation for the agent that rejected it, which is why Manata's charge that effects of intercessory prayer on the part of Synergists could be a 'futile' action was ultimately defeated.
He then levels criticism for me citing Ephesians 5:5 to show that those who are not saved have no inheritance in God's kingdom in relation to Revelation 22:19, but ironically defends his view with,
i) He’s alluded to the OT laws and promises of inheritance. In the OT, those were originally literal (although, even in the OT, the concept of inherence could be used in a typological or spiritual sense).
Oh yeah, Paul plainly stating that no unrighteous person has any inheritance in the kingdom of God has no bearing when Hays wants false converts to have some anyway, so of course strained comparisons between our eternal reward and the concept of earthly inheritance in the Old Testament are perfectly fine. It's all so clear to me now.
ii) His allusion also involves a comparison between OT Jews and NT Christians. And, under *both* Testaments, there was a difference between election and membership in the covenant community. You didn’t have to be regenerate to belong to the covenant community. Circumcision of the heart was always an ideal. But participation in the life of Israel could move on two different planes.
Which is entirely beside the point. But even by that comparison, inheritance that was taken from those who did not remain faithful to the old covenant was their own inheritance, not some inheritance that could have been theirs conditioned on them having been born into another family. Going back to what John actually said, the holy city is reserved only for those whose names are in the book of life,
But there shall by no means enter it anything that defiles, or causes an abomination or a lie, but only those who are written in the Lamb's Book of Life. (Revelation 21:27)
Which merely being a 'member of a community' cannot confer, despite Hays' attempts to confuse the issue and connect it to excommmunication.
He also responded to my statement,
"So Hays' logic effectively makes the consequence here strictly into God taking from the violators a share in His kingdom that they never really possessed and that He never had any intention of giving them anyway, further driven home by the fact that only those whose names are in the book of life have any right to enter the holy city at all (Revelation 21:27)."
with,
i) The offer of the gospel is a conditional offer. In fact, that’s stated in the verse (22:17) just previous to the inscriptional curse in vv18-19.
ii) And one can have a share in the inheritance without being an heir. You can be cut out of the will.
Exactly, and since no unbeliever has any inheritance at all in God's kingdom, then we who do have a heavenly inheritance stored up for us possibly being 'cut out of the will' establishes the fact of conditional security nicely.
To the latter part ("and that He never had any intention of giving them anyway"), he writes:
True, that’s an implication of Calvinism. What’s more, that’s also an implication of Arminianism. God can’t very well intend to confer a benefit on those whom he foreknew would never be beneficiaries.
Sure He can, provided He does not bestow said benefit irresistibly (or 'effectively' in the language of Hayseedian), it would simply mean that God foreknows that some will resist the good He intends for them by His offer. Hasn't Hays read Jeremiah 42 yet? When God said,
'If you will still remain in this land, then I will build you and not pull you down, and I will plant you and not pluck you up. For I relent concerning the disaster that I have brought upon you. Do not be afraid of the king of Babylon, of whom you are afraid; do not be afraid of him,' says the LORD, 'for I am with you, to save you and deliver you from his hand. And I will show you mercy, that he may have mercy on you and cause you to return to your own land.' (Jeremiah 42:10-12)
God states His intention that He is with them to deliver them from the king of Babylon; but then He also states the consequences He would bring upon them if they did not obey Him, which unfortunately for them, were rather harsh.
And I have this day declared it to you, but you have not obeyed the voice of the LORD your God, or anything which He has sent you by me. (Jeremiah 42:21)
When I defended my view of God's foreknowledge, Hays gave a few comments as well,
"Let's see, God Himself transcends time."
So there’s not the semblance of an argument to support his contention. Just blustery assertion.
Yeah right, as opposed to all the empirical evidence Hays has tendered. I don't think the idea that the infinite God who transcends time and can operate outside the flow of time can fully comprehend a contingent 'time line' more clearly than we can a simple number line is very far-fetched at all. Feel free to disagree, but there isn't any biblical or tenable logical evidence to the contrary. For all his ferocious yapping, Hays still can't produce a single solid reason why God's omniscience would be limited if libertarian decisions are a reality. Most humorously, he states,
ii) Once again, to claim that something "transcends time" says nothing about foreknowledge. The Mandelbrot set transcends time. Does the Mandelbrot set know the future?
Trying to establish limits on the possibilities of the living God's knowledge by drawing a very vague comparison to a non-living fractal -- an infinitely recursive dumb argument. Nice one Steve!
To recap, Manata was decisively defeated by both Kangaroodort and Arminian on his point about intercessory prayer, for even a foreordained prayer cannot serve as a 'means' to something that has already been unconditionally decreed (see our March 25, 2008 post). Hays has tried to keep his head above water, but his efforts pretty amount to trying to change the meaning of 'resistible' to 'ineffective,' casting ambiguity on the implications of having a part in New Jerusalem (rather poorly I might add), insisting that God couldn't foreknow libertarian choices with no clear evidence of such, and mumbling about God being incompetent in the Synergist paradigm -- which was thoroughly shot down by way of 1 Corinthians 10:13, which Hays has offered no real answer to (though I'm positive he can once more think up some words to say in lieu of one); in other words, no substantial change from the last time we left him. By this point, they're not any challenge to refute, but it's just as well that our interaction ends here considering this statement by Hays,
As far as that goes, we have no evidence that Ben and J.C. haven’t been sockpuppeting. They’ve denied it, but they’ve also defined sockpuppeting as a deceptive practice-so if they were sockpuppeting, we’d expect them to deny it. Deceivers lie about their underhanded ways, do they not?
So why should anyone take *their* word for it? That’s like asking a hacker if he makes a living as a hacker. You think he’s going to admit it?
In fact, for someone who says he’s not a sockpuppet, J.C. demonstrates a very detailed understanding of the process. That, combined with his fixation on sockpuppetry, suggests an exercise in misdirection. Deflect attention away from what you’re doing by accusing the other guy of doing the same thing.
Does even he believe a word he's saying? No evidence that we haven't been sockpuppeting? Such insinuation is rooted in a rather simplistic usage of Argumentum ad Ignorantiam (appeal to ignorance - e.g. "Can you PROVE that you've never robbed a gas station?"). I wonder what he would consider 'evidence' of us not doing something.... The fact that Hays would resort to such sophomoric logical fallacy reflects poorly on his reasoning skills, but such desperate irrational outbursts from him aren't surprising considering our discussion to this point.
Even sadder is his baseless insinuation that we are being dishonest with them. For those of you who haven't kept up with the whole conversation, Kangaroodort and I discovered an interesting series of coincidences in spelling/argument structure/writing style/punctuation/etc. that raised our suspicions as to whether at least one member of Triablogue was using sockpuppets. We compiled and presented our evidence of the instances we thought suspicious (see the March 13, 2008 post) but made no accusations, we simply asked them if any of them had been posting as other users in the course of our discussion. We received several replies, but no straight answers to the question, so we continued to ask. Now, not only do they refuse to level with us, Hays insinuates that we've been lying to them. I believe this succinctly demonstrates what I've suspected for some time now: Triablogue as a whole is not worth the time or effort to interact with.
If they don't even have the scruples to deal honestly with Christian brothers regarding to our discussions (evidenced both by this affair and their handling of quotes by those they argue against - such as Hays' terrible misuse of my comments cited in our March 11 post), then they are far below par as teachers of doctrine for any camp of Christian orthodoxy, and their writing deserves to be ignored like the rest of the spam. It's sad that it's come to this, but even the Junkyard doesn't handle stuff that repulsive.
I won't go so low as to imply that their Calvinism is what fuels this kind of behavior, I've simply known too many honest Calvinists to believe that. But if this sort of thing is what the latest 'reformed resurgence' is breeding and encouraging in its front lines now...if this is how they are trying to achieve their ends, what they are willing to do and what they approve of...God help them, their problems go far beyond doctrinal issues.
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Triabologna
Not getting the picture.
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April 1, 2008
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No April 1st jokes from me this year, but Hays fills that void with his last response. He puts up some more interesting evasions, but we still don't have an actual answer from Triablogue about whether they've been sockpuppeting. His arguments follow suit as he makes another attempt.
i) A *possible* deterrent is not the same thing as an *effective* deterrent.
Again, Hays errantly equates 'effectiveness' with 'irresistibility.' which has already been shown to be an untenable view that suddenly makes traffic violations contingent upon the road signs instead of the drivers.
ii) And in what sense would God intend to "possibly" deter someone? If he knows the future, then he knows whether or not his warning will have its intended effect.
and,
How does God intend for something to have a particular effect, as a means to an end, when he foreknows that it will prove to be ineffective?
In that he allows it to be conditioned upon a free decision. God's foreknowledge of what the decision will be does not negate His intent or its contingency, which I address next. Hays' logic here can be summed up with,
If a warning can be resisted, then it was ineffective in restraining the individual.
Which is of course silly, as the warning has done all in its scope that is needed to produce effect (and is thus an 'effective' warning). A radio tower that broadcasts a signal isn't suddenly 'ineffective' at getting the station's signal to its listeners if a radio that could be receiving its signal comes unplugged. The fault is not with the transmitter, but the receiver. Hays also can't get around the fact that God gives for every temptation a way of escape, which since Christians don't always resist temptation, would render God's provision 'ineffective' by his definition.
Steve also argues that if God intended one thing for us, but we reject it, that it would make God incompetent, but again this view is lacking. God can give genuine opportunity intended for our good, knowing it won't be received. This says nothing of God's competence, for the rejection of His goodness by a free agent is not a matter of God's competence, but rather the stubbornness of those who despise Him. His foreknowledge of their impenitence does not preclude Him from graciously and genuinely offering His goodness, for if He doesn't irresistibly press His offer, then the willful incompetence can only lie those who reject Him.
This again is shown in His provision against temptation which I've cited from 1 Corinthians 10:13, for God graciously gives us a way to escape every temptation with the intent that we be able to endure it, for it plainly says that He will not let us be tempted beyond what we are able. His foreknowledge of the times we fail despite His more than adequate provision does not alter that intent or His competence. Now if we are not tempted beyond what we are able, then logically, God's grace is sufficient to help us overcome any temptation and therefore effective (literally: 'adequate to accomplish a purpose'). Any lapses we suffer then are not because His grace is 'ineffective,' but because we have not walked in it.
The Arminian alleges that Calvinism renders the warnings "meaningless." But if a warning successfully deters someone, then how does the efficacy of the warning subvert its purpose-when it’s purpose was to act as a deterrent?
I don't recall arguing that it did -- assuming a proper definition of 'efficacy,' and the fact that warnings can be more than just deterrents. The problem comes when one teaches that a saint suffering such a consequence is not a genuine possibility, which makes void any real sense of warning where the saints are concerned, since it turns both the action that it warns against and its consequence into absurdities.
So a warning is "effective" as a "preventative" even if it fails to prevent someone from doing what he was forewarned to avoid. If it prevents him from doing it, it’s effective-and if it doesn’t prevent him from doing it, it’s effective.
Such quaint oversimplification. Going back to the parallel of a radio tower, the tower's job truly is to send signals for the radios to receive, but the fact that a non-functioning radio isn't receiving any transmission from a fully operational tower isn't due to any fault or ineffectiveness in the transmitter, for the transmitter is doing exactly what is necessary on its end to produce the desired effect. The tower in this case is an effective mechanism in that it makes it possible for signals to be received provided the receivers are functional, and it's absurd to call it 'ineffective' if a radio is broken or turned off and stops receiving signal (especially if other radios are receiving it). Likewise, the warnings of God are effective deterrents that let us know very clearly what God wants us to avoid, provided those who are warned take heed. If someone gives no thought to such a warning, it isn't due to deficiency or ineffectiveness in the warning itself (plainly evidenced by the fact that others do heed it), but in the decision of the hearer. Once again, Hays' terrible logic is exposed as so much static.
He tries to tap dance around Revelation 22:19 once more,
The language of apportionment (meros) is an allusion to OT land-promises and the allotment of land to the respective tribes of Israel. That supplies the background for John's figurative usage. So this involves an analogy between OT Israel and the NT church. How then do we unpack the metaphor? Members of the OT covenant community were apportioned certain parcels of the promised land according to their clan. But the land-promises were conditional (i.e., the curse sanctions). A Jewish apostate could lose his inheritance. Likewise, a member of the visible church (=NT covenant community) can lose his conditional share in the new Eden or the New Jerusalem. Although election is unconditional, the offer of the gospel is conditional (repentance and faith). Yet that’s not the same thing as losing one's salvation. It says nothing about one's prior state of grace. An OT Jew could inherit land even though he wasn't a true believer. And he could also be cut off from the community of faith if he became a public and impenitent covenant-breaker. By the same token, one can be a member of the visible church and then be excommunicated. You may have been a member merely because you were the child of a member, or the spouse of a member. You went through the motions.
Which explanation is refuted by the fact that those who are not truly saved have no inheritance in God's kingdom (Ephesians 5:5) to be taken away, which I've cited before. So Hays' logic effectively makes the consequence here strictly into God taking from the violators a share in His kingdom that they never really possessed and that He never had any intention of giving them anyway, further driven home by the fact that only those whose names are in the book of life have any right to enter the holy city at all (Revelation 21:27). His analogy also breaks down in that a Jew who was not a 'true believer' could retain his allotted inheritance, such a parallel cannot possibly extend to the partakers of the new covenant and hence such a comparison can't hold, making such eisegesis critically lacking as a defense.
To the contrary, I’ve given him very specific reasons for why Arminian theology cannot square divine foreknowledge with libertarian freedom. J.C’s only response is to say that God is timeless. But that’s a non sequitur.
Let's see, God Himself transcends time, and His infinite knowledge likewise transcends time; God has wisdom and power great enough to create creatures capable of making libertarian decisions within time, but since His knowledge isn't temporally bound, there is no reason that He can't know those libertarian choices despite the feeble objections of beings whose knowledge is bound by time. That pretty much covers all of Hays' superficial yapping. With that, we toss another piece of garbage by Hays onto the pile.
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